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Why It Is They and Not We Who Sit on the
Woolsack—A Motion to Dismiss in EEOC v. United
Parcel Service in the Northern District of Illinois+
John C. Hendrickson*
I find it intriguing, as a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) regional attorney, that a significant number of defense counsel in various
EEOC cases contemporaneously seize upon the same litigation strategy or tactic.
One has the sense that they all attend the same seminars and fear failing to use the
+ This Article had its genesis in a paper I originally prepared with Nikki Flores (a law
student intern in the EEOC Chicago District Office) for delivery at the November 8, 2010,
meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law in Chicago.
That paper, which is the source of much of what follows here, was entitled: What Lies Ahead?
Notice Pleading and Iqbal and Twombly in EEOC Employment Discrimination Litigation. In
the intervening years, I have repeatedly updated What Lies Ahead? to take into account more
recent developments, and various versions of it have been published in continuing legal education publications of the Chicago Bar Association, the Practicing Law Institute, the American
Bar Association, and Law Bulletin Seminars. With each of those updates, the motion to dismiss
proceedings in EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 09-CV-5291, 2010 WL 3700704 (N.D.
Ill. filed Aug. 27, 2009), emerged as the subject of more discussion, to the extent I concluded,
at the risk of being accused of recycling of my own work too much, that a separate paper more
narrowly focused on United Parcel Service was warranted. I was also fascinated by the court’s
consideration of the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, although it is true that this Article is derivative of and draws freely and at length from What Lies Ahead?, I make no apologies because
the subject matter is fascinating.
* John Hendrickson is the regional attorney in the Chicago District Office of the EEOC.
However, the author’s remarks are his own. They have not been reviewed, vetted, or approved
by the EEOC. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the EEOC, or any official of the
EEOC, and they do not in any respect constitute an official or authorized statement of any
EEOC policy or practice. The author acknowledges the text and citation editing contributions
of Maryam Arfeen, a member of the University of Notre Dame Law School Class of 2014 and
a law student intern in the Chicago District Office of the EEOC during the summer of 2013.
Her assistance was invaluable.
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tactic du jour. A trend recently in vogue, and I believe happily now on the wane,
involved moving to dismiss EEOC complaints on the basis of tortured readings of
the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding notice pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), coupled
especially with an “outlier” decision of the Northern District of Iowa in EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Iowa 2009), rev’d 679 F.3d
657 (8th Cir. 2012).
Based on these decisions and a few others, defense counsel have argued
that the EEOC cannot seek monetary or other relief for victims of employment
discrimination unless the victims have been individually identified in the administrative investigation that preceded the lawsuit, the Commission conciliated with the
employer with respect to each victim separately, and each victim was individually
identified in the complaint filed in federal district court.
In practice, however, the EEOC has a long history of litigating class actions, including to multi-million dollar consent decrees, in cases in which many
relief recipients were identified only in the course of the litigation or during relief
proceedings. Certainly this was true, for example, in Chicago Miniature (phase I
liability verdict reversed on appeal), Mitsubishi ($34 million consent decree), Dial
Corporation ($10 million consent decree), Sears Roebuck ($6.2 million consent
decree), Supervalu ($3.2 million consent decree), and International Profit Associates ($8 million consent decree)—all cases litigated by my office in Chicago.1 We
in Chicago were therefore rocked by the initial success of United Parcel Service in
one of our maximum leave/discharge cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2
In this short Article, I trace the extended proceedings on the defendant’s
motion to dismiss in United Parcel Service for three reasons. First, in my mind,
United Parcel Service signals the demise of a defense strategy that never had any
real merit. Second, United Parcel Service illuminates how procedures routinely
taken for granted, such as pleading rules perhaps deemed inconsequential, can have
an enormous impact on the ability of the EEOC to secure civil rights on the job.
Third, United Postal Service is a teaching moment for civil rights litigators, showing that persistence in the pursuit of a better outcome can make a difference.
I. Proceedings on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in United Parcel Service
A. Motion to Dismiss
Early on in United Parcel Service, Judge Robert M. Dow of the Northern
District of Illinois appeared to introduce a new factor into the Iqbal-Twombly cal1.
See infra Appendix.
2.
See EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 09-CV-5291, 2010 WL 3700704 (N.D.
Ill. filed Aug. 27, 2009).
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culus in ADA cases.3 He struck down the EEOC’s allegations that United Parcel
Service (UPS) failed to reasonably accommodate a disabled charging party on the
grounds that “the complaint [did] not allege sufficient facts demonstrating that [the
charging party] (or the potential class members) were qualified individuals.”4 It
was not the first time an EEOC claim with respect to a charging party had been
dismissed. Completely unexpected, however, was the clause pertaining to the dismissal with respect to the class—the members of which the EEOC had not identified in the complaint and that it expected to identify during the litigation. While
the EEOC worked to overturn the unprecedented ruling, UPS aimed its efforts at
upholding the dismissal. Over the following two-plus years, both parties continued
to litigate the motion to dismiss before Judge Dow. Judge Dow first wrote:
[A]s currently pled, the EEOC’s complaint is so threadbare, conclusory, and formulaic that it does not even allow the Court to reasonably infer that [the charging party] or proposed class members
have a plausible basis for claiming to be “otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation.”5
Judge Dow’s initial opinion does not indicate how high the court intended to set
the bar for EEOC pleadings under the ADA. Nevertheless, there was a basis for
concern in its statement that “the complaint does not allege sufficient facts demonstrating that [the charging party] (or the potential class members) were qualified
individuals.”6 One perspective is that demonstrating sounds very much like establishing or proving, and that is exactly what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—
even post-Iqbal—do not require.
Additionally troubling is the court’s proposition that disability cases are
different, as far as pleading is concerned, from Title VII race cases “[b]ecause disability, unlike race, in some circumstances can be a legitimate consideration in
employment decisions. . . .”7 Finally, it is unclear what the court intended with its
references to “potential class members.”8 How is the EEOC, when it proceeds on
behalf of a class whose members will be identified during the course of litigation,
supposed to demonstrate in its complaint that the potential class members are qualified? May an employer successfully torpedo the pleading of an ADA class action by
suppressing enough information during the EEOC’s pre-suit administrative process
3.
Id.
4.
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291,
2010 WL 3700704, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2010) (emphasis added).
5.
Id. (citation omitted).
6.
Id. (emphasis added).
7.
Id. at 9.
8.
Id. at 7.
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to prevent the agency from making the kind of demonstration in the complaint that
the court thinks necessary?
On September 30, 2010, twenty days after dismissal of its first complaint,
the EEOC filed a first amended complaint.9 In the first amended complaint, the
EEOC alleged that:
Since at least 2002, UPS has maintained an inflexible 12-month
leave policy which does not provide for reasonable accommodation
of qualified individuals with disabilities and which instead provides
for termination of their employment, in violation of Sections 102(a)
and 102(b)(3)(A) and (b)(5)(A) of Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§
12112(a) and 12112(b)(3)(A) and (b)(5)(A).10

		
The EEOC described in detail the effect of this policy on two victims, Trudi Momsen and Mavis Luvert.11 The EEOC then described a class of additional victims
affected by the same policy—a class of victims for whom the EEOC is seeking
relief:12
Similar to Momsen and Luvert, each class member is a qualified
individual with a disability who could perform the essential functions of his or her job with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Because disabilities, and the reasonable accommodations appropriate for particular individuals with disabilities, may vary significantly, the reasonable accommodations which UPS should have made
available to class members to permit them to perform the essential
functions of their jobs (with or without a reasonable accommodation), would not have all been the same. The reasonable accommodations would have varied from class member to class member on
an individual basis, as determined through an interactive process
between UPS and the individual class members. However, rather
than engage in that interactive process and reasonably accommodate
9.
First Amended Complaint at 2–3, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-291 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2010).
10. Id. at 2–4.
11. See id. at 3–5.
12. See id. at 5. The adequacy of the EEOC’s allegations as to Momsen and Luvert ceased
to figure in the dispute. See Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification at 3, United
Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2012) (“The adequacy of EEOC’s pleading with regard to these claimants is not at issue.”); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3,
United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013) (court noted “EEOC filed an
amended complaint asserting more robustly pleaded claims on behalf of Momsen [and] Luvert”
and otherwise addressed only unidentified victims).

94

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

		

Volume 2, Issue 1

these class members, without undue hardship to itself, UPS terminated the class members’ employment, pursuant to its policy described in paragraph 8.13
The court, at that time, refused to allow the EEOC to proceed with its claims
for relief on behalf of these claimants, stating:
[T]he EEOC has not alleged adequate factual information in its
complaint with respect to the unidentified class members as it has
not pleaded with adequate specificity facts establishing the plausibility of a claim that each class member is a qualified individual
under the ADA who could have performed his or her job with or
without a reasonable accommodation. Without additional detail, the
EEOC’s allegations do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” The Court therefore grants UPS’s motion to dismiss the
claims with respect to unidentified class members . . . .14
The EEOC then motioned for leave to file its second amended complaint, adding
a claim under Section 102(b)(6) of the ADA, but not alleging any additional facts
with regard to unidentified class members.15 The court dismissed this motion for
leave to file the second amended complaint, stating “[b]ecause Section 102(b)(6)
only protects qualified individuals with disabilities, the EEOC needed to plead with
adequate specificity facts supporting its contention that the unidentified class members meet this requirement.”16
Subsequently, the EEOC sought certification for interlocutory review of this
decision as to its claim on behalf of unidentified victims.17 In determining to pursue
an interlocutory appeal, we at the EEOC considered where the district court might
have conceptually gone off the tracks. The court’s own language from its dismissal
of the EEOC’s first amended complaint was revealing.18 The court stated that the
EEOC “has not pleaded with adequate specificity facts establishing the plausibility
of a claim that each class member is a qualified individual. . . .”19 That is to say,
the court appeared to be holding that there are a multiplicity of claims in the case,
13. Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification, supra note 12.
14. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291(N.D.
Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d
773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007)).
15. See Second Amended Complaint, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 10830358.
16. Memorandum Opinion and Order, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D.
Ill. July 3, 2012).
17. See Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification, supra note 12.
18. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 14.
19. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Concentra Health Servs., Inc., at 777 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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each one separately either belonging to or being made on behalf of each class member and each of which must appear in a complaint to be separately and individually plausible.20 The problem is that in cases brought by the EEOC the only party
plaintiff is the EEOC, and there is only one claim—the claim brought by the EEOC
against the employer on the grounds of discrimination. That single claim, in and of
itself, satisfies the Iqbal plausibility requirement.21
B. Reconsideration of Motion to Dismiss
Dedicated litigators are seldom willing to “cut some slack” for colleagues
on the bench who, in the litigators’ own esteemed judgment, “got it wrong.” But at
times, some of our brethren in black robes show us why it is they and not we who sit
“on the woolsack.”22 That is precisely what happened in United Parcel Service.23 In
an extended memorandum opinion and order entered January 11, 2013, Judge Dow
exhaustively reviewed the litigation of the motion to dismiss and the applicable
law (including Iqbal and Twombly), and on his own motion reconsidered.24 Judge
Dow withdrew his earlier rulings, denied the UPS motion to dismiss, granted the
EEOC leave to file its second amended complaint, and denied the EEOC’s motion
for a certificate of appealability as moot.25 The court’s language turned everything
20. See generally United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2010 WL 3700704.
21. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).
22. Students of Willis L.M. Reese, the great Columbia Law School professor and American Law Institute reporter, will recall the towering figure with the enormous wing-span he was
in the classroom. They will recall him describing—with wings extended—how in the earliest days courts were sometimes convened in the shade of large trees, and the judges, perhaps
“sitting in chancery,” might be seated before the petitioners on sacks full of wool, which may
have been awaiting delivery or sale, or even have been the subject of “the litigation.” Hence,
the earliest dispensers of the common law and their brethren to this day may be said, at least to
the still admiring students of Professor Reese to “sit on the woolsack.” It is an article of faith
among those who practice the profession that “on the woolsack” is a noble place to sit.
23. See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 1–2. As to whether a federal judge’s doing a 180-degree turnaround without
having been reversed is actually noteworthy, consider an October 16, 2013, story in The New
York Times headlined Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID. John Schwartz,
Judge in Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2013, at A16.
The reporter observed that “it is the kind of thought that rarely passes the lips of a member of
the federal judiciary: I was wrong,” and took note of a new book by Seventh Circuit U.S. Court
of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging. Id. The article states that in the
book Judge Posner wrote, “I plead guilty to having written the majority opinion” in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in 2008. Id. In Crawford, the Seventh Circuit upheld an Indiana voter identification law, which Judge Posner wrote
is “‘a type of law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud
prevention.’” Id. The New York Times article further noted that when Judge Posner was asked
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around and made it right:
Upon revisiting EEOC’s first amended complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the EEOC’s favor, the Court concludes that the first amended complaint satisfies these standards and
should not have been dismissed. . . .
But this broader case is brought by EEOC, which frequently and in this instance “does not stand in the employee’s shoes.”
EEOC, charged with “advanc[ing] the public interest in preventing
and remedying employment discrimination,” is pursuing this action
on behalf of a nationwide class of aggrieved individuals. And although EEOC is subject to the federal pleading rules when acting in
this capacity, the unique role of the EEOC is such that courts generally have allowed complaints with “class” allegations comparable
to those asserted here to move forward, both pre- and post-Twombly
and Iqbal . . . .
Iqbal and Twombly do not require plaintiffs, including EEOC,
to plead detailed factual allegations supporting the individual claims
of every possible member of a class. EEOC must merely “plead[]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that UPS violated provisions of the ADA as to the unidentified
individuals. It has done that.26
Judge Dow declined to follow the once trendsetting decision in EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc.27 CRST was a Title VII class action sex discrimination
case. The EEOC contended that the national long haul trucking company maintained a system in which newly-hired female driver-trainees were sexually harassed
by experienced male drivers assigned to accompany, train, and supervise them during their initial long haul runs.28 The district court entered summary judgment in
favor of defendant CRST and against the EEOC on the EEOC’s pattern or practice
claim. It then dismissed the remaining sixty-seven individual claims that survived
summary judgment on the grounds that the EEOC did not, during the statutory presuit conciliation process, specifically identify and attempt to negotiate settlements
in an October 11, 2013, Huffington Post video interview whether the court had gotten its ruling
in Crawford wrong he responded, “‘Yes. Absolutely.’” Id. While Judge Posner’s about-face in
Crawford comes too late to have avoided the Supreme Court’s compounding of the error, it will
hopefully check the impact of the decision.
26. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12, at 8–11 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
27. 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012).
28. Id. at 665–67.
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with respect to each class member separately.29 The EEOC’s position was that the
law did not require such separate individualized negotiations during conciliation.30
In any event, the EEOC argued such negotiations would have been impossible because during the agency’s administrative investigation that preceded conciliation
CRST refused and failed to disclose numerous complaints of sexual harassment
that would have made victim identification possible.31
In declining to follow CRST, Judge Dow wrote:
[T]he Seventh Circuit has made clear that courts “have no business limiting
[an EEOC] suit to claims that the court finds to be supported by the evidence obtained in the Commission’s investigation,” and EEOC has alleged
. . . that “[a]ll conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have
been fulfilled.”32
But the United Parcel Service motion to dismiss saga had not fully run its course.
29. Id. at 670–74.
30. Id. at 673.
31. See Circuit Judge Murphy’s dissent in CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 695–97
(8th Cir. 2012) (“Although many women had reported harassment . . . CRST furnished to the
Commission only two names. . . . Using [the majority’s] standard employers can avoid disclosure to the EEOC of complaining workers [during] investigation and conciliation, then reveal
the names during court order discovery, and seek dismissal of the entire case on the ground of
inadequate pursuit efforts by the EEOC.”).
32. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12, at 11–12 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted). Judge Dow is not alone in declining to follow CRST and
allowing unidentified victims to be in a suit as a class, rather than as individuals. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., No. 10-1284, 2012 WL 3017869, at *18 (W.D. Pa. July 23,
2012) (citations omitted) (finding after a survey of decisions including post-Iqbal and Twombly
decisions that naming as of yet unidentified victims in the complaint by the EEOC was not required: “[t]his Court agrees with these decisions and likewise holds that Iqbal and Twombly do
not require the EEOC to name all of the potential class members in its amended Complaint. The
Court acknowledges U.S. Steel’s emphasis in [CRST]. However, the Court notes that the Eighth
Circuit’s holdings in CRST are not binding on this Court.”); EEOC v. Source One Staffing, Inc.,
No. 11-C-6754, 2013 WL 25033, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2013) (granting the EEOC motion for a
protective order, notwithstanding defendant’s invocation of CRST: “this Court already has held
that the EEOC cannot reasonably be expected to identify the ‘class members’ who were denied
job assignments because of their sex or estimate the damages resulting from an alleged pattern
or practice of discrimination without expert analysis of . . . assignment and payroll data” produced in discovery); EEOC v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904–05 (6th Cir. 2012) (disagreeing
with a lower court’s reliance on CRST, the court said that, “[W]e recognized that ‘the nature and
extent of an EEOC investigation. . . is a matter within the discretion of th[e] agency’. . . . Given
that [the EEOC letter of determination and proposed conciliation agreement] were provided to
Cintas . . . there is no basis for concluding that Cintas was unaware that the EEOC had investigated and was seeking to conciliate class-wide claims. . . . [I[t is clear that the EEOC satisfied
its administrative prerequisites to suit.”).
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On February 1, 2013, UPS petitioned Judge Dow to certify a “question” supposedly
related to his January 11, 2013, order: “Can EEOC satisfy the pleading requirements
of [Twombly] . . . when each proposed individual for whom EEOC seeks relief was
unable to work for 12 months at the time of separation?”33 UPS apparently hoped
to convince Judge Dow and the Seventh Circuit that it could never be a reasonable accommodation to allow a day more than twelve months leave, and therefore
that any complaint suggesting anything to the contrary could never be “plausible,”
even if it was the employer itself who was responsible for the absence.34 Under
this theory, it would be permissible for UPS to keep disabled workers off the job
for twelve months by denying an employee who was released to return to work the
opportunity to do so, and then terminating him or her at the twelve-month mark.
Suffice it to say that UPS’s contentions had not figured in Judge Dow’s January 11,
2013 Memorandum Opinion and Order35 and they sounded more like arguments
appropriate, if at all, for a motion for summary judgment.
Judge Dow remained convinced that, although the issue before him involved a controlling and contestable question of law, his decision denying the UPS
motion to dismiss was correct and that permitting an interlocutory appeal would not
materially advance the ultimate termination of the case36:
[T]he Court remains confident of the correctness of its January 11
ruling—indeed, it would not have reconsidered on its own motion
the prior ruling had that not been the case—the fact that the same
judge has viewed the question to be close enough to warrant reconsideration is testimony to both the difficulty and the contestability
of the issue . . . .
After careful consideration of the alternative paths . . . the Court
concludes that further litigation in the district court, augmented as
appropriate with expedited briefing on potentially dispositive issues,
would serve the interests of justice and efficiency better than certifying a question or an issue for interlocutory appeal. The Court therefore denies the motion for interlocutory appeal . . . . 37
So that is how things stand in EEOC v. United Parcel Service as of summer
33. Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for 1292(b) Certification, supra note 12, at 2.
34. See id. at 2–3 (“Indeed, EEOC’s unsupported conclusion that all class members fall
within the protected class is highly doubtful because every class member was unable to work
for 12 months at the time of separation and the Seventh Circuit has never found any employee
who missed more than two months of work to be a qualified individual with a disability.”).
35. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 12.
36. See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV5291 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013).
37. Id.
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2013.38 The case has now been referred to the assigned magistrate judge for supervision of discovery and exploration of settlement.39 Either way, the court has taken
an important step back from the brink and the notion that the EEOC cannot pursue
relief with respect to victims who are not identified in the EEOC’s complaint has
proven to be a short-lived trend.
II.

Looking Ahead

It is a good thing that the trend was short lived. If United Parcel Service
had been decided differently, there would be two concerns as to how it would have
combined with Iqbal and Twombly to affect EEOC employment discrimination litigation down the road, and how even as decided, it may still affect other districts
and courts. The first concern is that if there was a genuine, long-term trend away
from notice pleading, the EEOC might be expected to begin specifically demonstrating in its complaints, including in class actions, that its stated claim against an
employer was an aggregation of individual claims of class members, each of which
would be separately considered “plausible” on an individual basis. Such an outcome would likely spell the end of class litigation by the EEOC, except on behalf of
the smallest classes of victims of discrimination. Can one imagine such a complaint
if there were 100 class members? What if there were 400 or more?
The EEOC has, for a very long time as a litigating agency, pursued relief not
only on behalf of victims of discrimination specifically identified in the course of its
administrative investigations, but also on behalf of victims identified through discovery in the course of litigation—that is, after suit is filed. In many cases such as
Chicago Miniature,40 Mitsubishi,41 Dial,42 Sears Roebuck,43 and Roadway,44 enough
victims of the particular kind of discrimination at issue were identified during the
administrative investigation to lead to the inescapable conclusion that employers
were acting illegally, not only with respect to those victims, but also with many
38. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2010 WL 3700704. Therein lies the downside to this tale of
justice prevailing: EEOC v. United Parcel Service was filed in the Northern District of Illinois
on August 27, 2009, and as the case approached its third anniversary, the motion to dismiss
proceeding had just concluded and discovery was just set to begin. One could observe that the
wheels of justice do grind slowly.
39. Order of the Executive Committee, United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09-CV-5291 (N.D.
Ill. June 11, 2013).
40. EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 622 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d,
947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
41. EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996).
42. EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
43. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-C-7282, 2005 WL 2664367 (N.D. Ill. filed
Nov. 10, 2004).
44. EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 06-C-4805, 2007 WL 2198363 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 31,
2007).
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others yet to be identified. Often they were unidentified because employers were
unable or unwilling to provide, prior to litigation, information with regard to many
employees and applicants. In those cases, discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was the only process by which the EEOC could identify those victims and gather details about the specific discrimination they faced.
Plainly, it would be impossible for the EEOC to demonstrate plausibility
within the four corners of a complaint with respect to specific members of a victim
class that the EEOC has not yet identified without any discovery. However, if that
is where the federal courts were to head—and I do not believe they have or will—it
would severely prejudice the performance of the EEOC’s legal mandate to combat
and eradicate employment discrimination.
I do not believe federal courts will endorse onerous pleading requirements
with respect to the EEOC class actions anytime soon. Nevertheless, there have been
a few isolated district courts that have deemed it appropriate to enter substantive
adverse judgments on the merits in the EEOC cases. This is not merely because the
EEOC did not plead specifics with respect to individual victims, but also because
the EEOC did not specifically and individually investigate and conciliate with respect to unidentified victims and their particular circumstances during the administrative process before agency litigation.45 In my estimation, those decisions are
45. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012); EEOC v.
Bloomberg L.P., No. 07-CV-8383, 2013 WL 4799150, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) (granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment:“[T]he Court adopts the . . . reasoning from Chief
Judge Linda P. Reade’s analysis in [CRST], a case dismissed under similar circumstances.”).
The approach of these courts is contrary to the notion that the EEOC’s administrative processes,
including investigations and conciliations, are wholly within the discretion of the agency. For
example, EEOC v. Caterpillar, 409 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2005), holds that the agency’s investigations are not subject to judicial review. Title VII itself provides that the only test for a conciliation agreement is whether it is “acceptable” to the EEOC and that conciliation materials are
confidential. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). With respect to conciliation, District Judge Joe Billy
McDade observed in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., “A review of the relevant statutory language on conciliation reveals that substantial discretion is vested in the Commission . . . . An
effort by the Senate in 1972 to require judicial review of the Commission’s determinations of
‘acceptable’ agreements was soundly rejected. 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972). Such an
examination of the conciliation process was deemed unworkable. Id. at 3807.” 504 F. Supp.
241, 262 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Further, under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and otherwise, conciliation agreements are not subject to judicial review
because they do not constitute final agency decisions, and employers are always entitled to a
trial de novo on the issue of whether or not they engaged in employment discrimination. See,
e.g., Doe v. Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2006) (employing APA analysis to find Title
VII does not require charging party cooperation with EEOC conciliation prior to private suit);
Caterpillar, 409 F.3d at 832 (court relies on cases decided under the APA to find the EEOC
reasonable cause determination was not subject to review); Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679,
681–83 (7th Cir. 1979) (relying on the APA in rejecting a challenge to EEOC process). As
District Judge Milton Shadur observed years ago during an unreported colloquy at a hearing
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outliers and will wither and die on the vine, and never again receive any significant
following. Judge Dow’s rulings in United Parcel Service and other cases referred to
in this Article indicate that this process is already underway and I think irreversible.
The second concern relates to the conceptual basis some defense counsel
propose as a justification for their demands wanting an extraordinary amount of detail in employment discrimination complaints. Based on their reading of Iqbal and
Twombly, they argue that significant detail and specificity within complaints is necessary because otherwise employers do not know and cannot know the nature of the
actionable conduct with which they are charged. That situation may arise in select
cases with highly complex claims, but seldom in employment discrimination cases.
Overwhelmingly, standard notice pleading requirements have been more than sufficient for both plaintiffs and defendants. Further, because of the administrative
process that precedes and undergirds the EEOC litigation—a process in which the
employer-defendant is a party—protests of “don’t know” and “can’t know” do not
ring true.46
attended by the author in the Chicago Miniature case, when sued for employment discrimination employers are not entitled to two bites of the apple, with the first being litigation of
the EEOC administrative process and the second being the question of whether or not there
was discrimination. See EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 975–76
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (discussing the “undesirability of turning every properly-filed EEOC action
into a two-fold action”). As this Article was going to press, it became clear that, at least in
the Seventh Circuit, the EEOC has it right with respect to judicial review of conciliation. On
June 28, 2013, in an unusual move, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted
the EEOC’s petition for an interlocutory appeal in EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV879, 2012 WL 3800787 (S.D. Ill. May 30, 2013), in order to consider “the question whether
an alleged failure to conciliate is subject to judicial review in the form of an implied affirmative defense to the EEOC’s suit.” EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 13-2456, slip op. at 2 (7th
Cir. Dec. 20, 2013). On December 20, 2013, the Seventh Circuit announced a decision which
unequivocally supported the EEOC position, writing,
The language of [Title VII], the lack of a meaningful standard for courts to apply,
and the overall statutory scheme convince us that an alleged failure to conciliate is
not an affirmative defense to the merits of a discrimination suit. . . . We therefore
disagree with our colleagues in other circuits and hold that the statutory directive
to the EEOC to negotiate first and sue later does not implicitly create a defense
for employers who have allegedly violated Title VII.
Id. How squarely the entire Seventh Circuit stands behind this important decision is telegraphed
by the following extraordinary footnote: “We have circulated this opinion among all judges of
this court in regular active service pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge favored a rehearing en banc on the question of rejecting the implied affirmative defense for failure to conciliate.” Id. at 23 n.3.
46. By the time an EEOC case gets to court, the employer has typically: (1) dealt directly
with the charging party and class members, perhaps as long-term employees; (2) received a
charge of discrimination stating the charging party’s claim; (3) had an opportunity to mediate
the charge; (4) received requests for information and documents telegraphing the issues and
circumstances the EEOC is investigating; (5) prepared, usually with the assistance of counsel,

102

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

		

Volume 2, Issue 1

No one possesses more knowledge about an employer’s policies, practices,
and experiences with victims of employment discrimination than the employer.47
Even if an employer is unaware of the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged
discrimination before a charge is filed, by the time the EEOC files a complaint in
federal district court, the nature of the process has “educated” the employer and
claims to the contrary are almost always gamesmanship. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed precisely to supplant such antiquated schemes. Judge
Dow’s consideration of the defendant’s motion to dismiss in the EEOC v. United
Parcel Service gives me confidence that the modern principles memorialized in the
federal rules will survive the of recent squall surrounding Iqbal and Twombly.

a position statement detailing the charging party’s history and responding to the claim(s) of discrimination; (6) exchanged telephone calls and/or other correspondence with the EEOC staff;
(7) had the opportunity—because it supplied it—to itself examine virtually all or much of the
evidence the EEOC is looking at; (8) conducted its own investigation; (9) received a letter of
determination stating the nature of the cause finding; and (10) had the opportunity to engage in
conciliation during which the nature, scope, and remedy for the found discrimination may be
discussed. See generally The Charge Handling Process, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (Dec. 13, 2013).
47. Often in harassment cases, defendant-employers in conciliation and litigation take
the position that the victim(s) did not complain and that the employer never knew about the
harassment. Just as often discovery surfaces evidence that the victims did in fact complain, and
that the employer had been dealing ineffectively with the harasser’s conduct for a long time—
sometimes for years—by employing a multitude of bad management techniques (for example,
repeated verbal warnings, moving the harasser from one position or facility to another, telling
victims to stay away from the harasser, etc.). When such employers protest they never knew,
one can be forgiven for raising an eyebrow. As for no one ever complaining, here is a revealing vignette: The author recently sat through a conciliation meeting at which the employer was
represented by three attorneys, with two from one of the nation’s most highly regarded New
York “white shoe” law firms. A third attorney pushed the argument that no complaints had been
made. We later learned that, by that time, a charge of discrimination relating to the exact issue
presented had been filed prior to the conciliation meeting. When lead counsel was thereafter
confronted with this fact, the response was not that lead counsel didn’t know, but rather that it
was another attorney at the table who had made the misrepresentation. Lesson learned.
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Appendix
EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works
For more information on the Chicago Miniature case, see EEOC v. Chicago
Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (in this Title VII class
action recruitment and hiring case alleging racial discrimination, the court denied
the company’s motion for summary judgment, holding in November 1981 that the
EEOC’s determination that on its face states that widespread discrimination found in
investigation, followed by pleading, satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of Title
VII). This was followed by EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 622 F. Supp.
1281 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991) (EEOC class-wide recruitment and hiring claims were found to be appropriate because they developed in
course of a reasonable investigation of the plaintiff’s charge; while the court found
that there was a pattern and practice of class discrimination against black workers,
the court did not find that the individual plaintiff was discriminated against). For the
decision on remedies that followed, see EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works,
640 F. Supp 1291 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 1986) (holding that consistent discriminatory
underrepresentation of blacks in the employer’s recruitment and hiring for entry level factory jobs constituted a violation, such that every victim of the employer’s discrimination during set time period could become a class member entitled to relief).
This was followed by EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 668 F. Supp. 1150
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that in context of shortfall/pro rata procedure for classwide distribution of back pay, district court would implement back pay procedure to
comply with statutory mandate). Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974,
was reversed by 947 F.2d at 305–06 (holding that disparate treatment and disparate
impact findings were erroneous because they credited statistics that did not take into
account applicant preference and because anecdotal evidence presented at trial was
not significantly probative).
For more information, see also EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works,
110 F.R.D. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (after district court found employment discrimination on part of defendant-employer in class action, but ruled individual plaintiff had
not himself been victim of racial discrimination, individual plaintiff filed motion to
effect immediate appeal; the district court held that individual plaintiff entitled to
appeal disposition of claim immediately).
For more information, see also Randolph v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works,
No. 79-C-2362, 1986 WL 9535 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 22, 1986) (granting a former Chicago Miniature employee leave to proceed ‘forma pauperis’).
EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc.
For more information, see EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of
104

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality		

		

Volume 2, Issue 1

America, Inc.,102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (Title VII, class action sexual harassment
case in which the court upheld trial court order, which required the EEOC to send
employees a letter detailing complaint process as related to defendant employer’s
sexual harassment policy; motion for stay denied and appeal dismissed).
For more information, see also EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of
America, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the EEOC complied
with its statutory conciliation obligations before filing suit).
For more information, see also EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing
of America, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 164 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that the employer could
not interview employees concerning past incidents of harassment or retaliation other
than by noticed deposition, but could have ex parte contact with employees who
initiated discussions about claims of new harassment).
EEOC v. Dial Corp.
For more information, see Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion
in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Jane Doe and Related Evidence, EEOC v. Dial
Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001), 2000 WL 33912745 (Title VII, class action sexual harassment case, order granting defendant’s motion in limine to exclude
‘irrelevant’ testimony of a female executive, Jane Doe). See also Memorandum and
Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Unseal Briefs, Hearing Transcript, Court Order and
Deposition of Jane Doe, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (No. 99-C-3356), 2000 WL
33912746 (denying the EEOC’s motion to unseal briefs of Jane Doe); Memorandum and Order on Plaintiff EEOC’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dial Corp., 156 F.
Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356 2000 WL 684195 (granting the EEOC’s protective order
to protect identities of members of class action suit).
This was followed by EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (holding that the EEOC satisfied statutory obligation to conciliate and that administrative charge process was not circumvented), and then by Memorandum and
Order on Defendant’s Motion for Contempt Order, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No.
99-C-3356), 2001 WL 1945089 (holding the EEOC in contempt for violating parties’ stipulated protective order); Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion
for Certification of Issues for Appeal, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356),
2001 WL 1945088 (granting defendant’s motion for interlocutory review to determine, amongst other issues, whether Dial was given sufficient notice of the EEOC’s
pattern and practice claim at the administrative stage where the underlying charge
contained no allegations of a class-wide Title VII violation and the bulk of evidence
relied upon by the EEOC was revealed after it filed suit); Memorandum and Order
on Defendant’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Incurred to Prepare and Prosecute its Motion for an Order Holding EEOC in Contempt, Dial Corp, 156 F. Supp.
2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 1974084 (granting defendant’s petition for attorneys’
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fees and costs incurred to prepare and prosecute its motion for an order holding the
EEOC in contempt); Second Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion for
Contempt Order, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 1974085.
(finding that the EEOC complied with defendant’s petition for attorney’s fees and
costs, and the subject of that order was concluded). Those orders were followed by:
Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
Notice and Timeliness Rulings, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002
WL 1974072 (defendant’s motion denied); Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s
Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert Testimony, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp.
2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 31061088 (granting defendant’s motion, to an extent,
by excluding relevant portions of plaintiff’s expert report).
The motions were followed by the Memorandum and Order on Motion for Reconsideration of September 18, 2002, Ruling on Dial’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees,
Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C-3356), 2002 WL 32077351 (granting the
EEOC’s Motion for Reconsideration on the following three issues: first, that the
EEOC’s interrogatory responses were substantially correct; second, even in cases
where later deposition testimony did not conform with earlier interrogatory responses, the EEOC had a legitimate basis for including that information in its responses
based on the EEOC’s reasonable inquiry and belief that answers were correct; third,
the court’s reliance upon the EEOC’s legal assertion that each class member was subjected to sexual and sex-based harassment as grounds for sanctions was improper).
For more information, see also Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion
for Reconsideration of the Court’s Denial of its Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Alleged Harassment Before 1991 and, Alternatively, to Exclude Evidence
That is Not Relevant Background Evidence, Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d (No. 99-C3356), 2003 WL 1809467 (granting, in part, defendant’s motion; otherwise denying
the motion); Dial Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (defendant’s motion
for reconsideration of phased bifurcated arrangement laid out by the court denied).
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
For more information, see EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-C-7282,
2005 WL 2664367 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 22, 2005) (ADA class action case regarding medical
leave and reasonable accommodation, finding that the EEOC met its notice-pleading
requirements and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss case on grounds that the
EEOC did not qualify class members under the ADA).
EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc.
For more information, see EEOC v. Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-5637, 2010
WL 5071196 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2010) (ADA class action case regarding medical leave
and reasonable accommodation, denying the defendant’s request that the EEOC
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provide proper verification signed by each applicable claimant, instead requiring
that the EEOC need only meet with each claimant regarding three of the interrogatories, and to report inaccuracies from each claimant interrogatories to the defendant).
This was followed by Memorandum Opinion and Order, Supervalu, Inc., No.
09-CV-5637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2012), 2010 WL 5071196 (granting and denying in
part, the defendant’s motion to compel properly verified responses to their first set of
interrogatories; denying the plaintiff’s motion to compel a portion of the defendant’s
human resources database; granting and denying in part, the plaintiff’s motion to
compel regarding its Rule 34 request for entry upon land and inspection); Memorandum Opinion and Order, Supervalu, Inc., No. 09-CV-5637 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19,
2013), 2013 WL 1154217 (granting and denying in part the plaintiff’s motion for
civil contempt sanctions and to conduct limited discovery).
EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc.
For more information, see EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., 206
F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (Title VII class action sexual harassment case, denying
defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff’s production of interview notes because notes
are protected by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine). See also
Porter v. Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., Nos. 01-C-4427, 02-C-2790, 2003 WL 22956004
(Dec. 11, 2003) (defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied).
This was followed by EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., No. 01-C4427, 2007 WL 844555 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 16, 2007) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and holding that the EEOC met notice-pleading standards for
class suit, when defendant was engaged in pattern or practice of sexual discrimination towards all claimants generally); and by Order, Int’l Profit Assoc. Inc., No. 01C-4427 (N.D. Ill., Feb 22, 2008), 2008 WL 485130 (denying defendant’s motion to
reconsider order prohibiting settlement communications with claimants).
This was followed by EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., 654
F.Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ill. 2009) and Memorandum and Order, International Profit
Associates, Inc., No. 01-C-4427 (N.D. Ill., Feb 22, 2008), 2008 WL 4876860 (defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to three claimants granted; defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to three other claimants denied).
This was followed by EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc., 647
F.Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (defendant’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to eight claimants granted; defendant’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to twenty-four other claimants denied), and EEOC v. International Profit
Associates, Inc., No. 01-C-4427, 2010 WL 1416153 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 31, 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment).

107

